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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF Joan Marie Anderson for the Master of
Science in Psychology presented July 18, 1980.
Title:

Individual Differences in Imaginal and Verbal Information Processing Abilities.

APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE:

The ·present research is based on the theory that there are two
major modes of consciousness, verbal and imaginal, which are controlled
by the left and right hemispheres, respectively.

This project was con-

cerned with the relationship between these modes of consciousness and
the measures employed in this study.

The measures employed were an

ongoing mentation report (OMR), a paired-associate learning (PAL) task,
the Betts vividness of imagery questionnaire, the Gordon test of imagery
control, and the visual imagery scale of Imaginal Processes Inventory
(IPI).

EEG and EOG measures were recorded during the OMR, and lateral

,
I
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eye movement was taken as an indication of activation in the cerebral
hemisphere contralateral to the direction of eye movement.
The first hypothesis, that the type of OMR report would correspond
with hemisphere activation (perceptual report with left eye movement
and conceptual. report with right eye movement), was not supported.

The

second hypothesis concerned recall of concrete and abstract nouns on
the PAL task.

The prediction that imagers would perform superior to

verbalizers on trial II (concrete/imagery) and that verbalizers would
perform superior to imagers on trial III (abstract/verbal), was not
supported.

In fact, imagers recalled significantly more of the abstract

words on trial III than the verbalizers.

The last hypothesis predicted

correlations between the three self-report measures of imagery (Betts,
Gordon, and IPI) with rated vividness on the OMR reports.

OMR reports

were found to correlate significantly with the IPI scale of visual
imagery, but not with the Betts or Gordon tests.

It was concluded that

these measures were tapping different aspects of the imagery process.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

One of the most perplexing and enduring questions for man concerns
the problem of consciousness:

its nature and function.

This problem

has woven its way through history and is once again the focus of current research (Deikman, 1971; Jaynes, 1976; Ornstein, 1972; Tart, 1972;
Tomkins, 1962).

The present research project begins with an introduc-

tion to several related theories of consciousness, followed by a distinction between individuals in the way consciousness is experienced on
both a psychological and a physiological level.

Individuals differ in

the extent to which they employ verbal or imaginal processes as symbolic
habits.

Symbolic habits (modes) are ways we process data and represent

that information in consciousness.
tion in a linear way.

The verbal mode processes informa-

The imaginal mode processes information in a non-

linear, holistic way.
The main theme to emerge from the literature review is that there
appear to be two major modes of consciousness--verbal and imaginal-which are controlled by the left and right hemispheres, respectively.
This project was concerned with differentiating between verbal and
imaginal habits and correlating the two modes with several tasks.

The

measures employed for this purpose were a paired-associate learning
task, the Betts vividness of imagery questionnaire, and the Gordon test
of imagery control.

\
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A second study was conducted in conjunction with the current research project (Edney, 1980).

The second study, hereafter referred to

as Study II, was designed to compare three techniques of assessing waking fantasy.

The methodology presented here includes a description of

all Study II procedures, since the same subjects served in both studies.
The measures used in Study II included a Thematic Apperception Test
(TAT), the Imaginal Processes Inventory (IPI), and time-sampled ongoing
mentation reports (OMR).
the OMR and the IPI.

Study I and Study II shared certain data from

CHAPTER I I
SEVERAL RELATED THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Beneath man's thin veneer of consciousness lies a relatively uncharted realm of mental activity, the nature and function of which
have been nei·ther sytematically explored nor adequately conceptualized. (Ludwig, 1972, p. 11)
According to Tomkins (1962), the most essential characteristic of
a living system is its ability to duplicate itself in time and space.
Through the process of energy and information transformations, consciousness has evolved as a unique type of duplication by which some
aspects of the word reveal themselves to another part of the same
world.

Yet, the afferent sensory data are not directly transformed

into a conscious report.

What is consciously perceived is imagery which

is created by the organism itself, a process referred to as a "feedback
matching mechanism under central control" (Tomkins, 1962, p. 13).
Ornstein (1972) also discusses the construction of consciousness
in terms of a duplicating process.

He proposes, on the basis of evi-

dence from habituation studies, that we tune out the recurrences of the
world by makingamodel of the external world from selected input within
our nervous system.

We then test new input against this model, all of

the time programming, and continuously reprogramming or revising, our
models of the external world.

In this way we achieve some stability of

awareness out of the complex and continuously changing flow of information reaching our receptors.
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The necessity of such a process is due partially to the fact that,
as a receiver of data, an individual is being assailed with an overabundance of sensory stimulation which renders him/her vulnerable to confusion and to data overload.

Thus, the individual must somehow select

data to emphasize one sensory channel over another and focus on limited
aspects of the incoming data within that channel.

Matching this con-

stantly changing sensory input is a skill that one learns as any skill;
a skill which eventually supports subsystems in which central stimulation produces conscious imagery in the absence of afferent input (Tomkins, 1962).

Klinger (1971) discusses subsystems as processes which

encompass certain affective tones, associated memories, dispositions,
and attitudes most central to oneself, of which the imaginal aspect of
fantasy is a part.
Pylyshyn (1973) refers to cognitive representation as the form in
which our knowledge of the world is represented as a model in the mind.
Many psychologists assume that the only forms of mental representation
are words and images, but Pylyshyn points out that these do not exhaust
the available forms of mental representations.

They are, however, the

primary way we experience the underlying process of our cognitive representations in consciousness.
Neisser (1972) conceptualizes mind as the totality of ways that
people process information.

These processes result in representations

of the environment, available to consciousness, which have been constructed on the basis of specified data.

It is this construction, or

reconstruction, of internal representations of the environment in the
absence of external stimuli, that is referred to as imagery.

Imaging
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is a constructive process in the sense that while it depends on information stored earlier, it does not simply revive that information.
Rather, the individual is carrying out a new activity, perhaps forming
new representations more or less consistent with the original perception.

These processes may at times involve forming representations of

an entire environment, while at other times they may be more fragmentary.

In either case, they are complex and multi-layered, so that a

person's introspections may take many different forms and will be
easily influenced by extraneous factors.

Neisser (1972) concludes that

"if we consider the differences between individuals, it becomes increas-

ingly obvious that we would be wrong to consider imagery a unitary
phenomenon

11
(

p. 244).

Sperling

(cited in Pylyshyn, 1973) states

11

that in any system

which examines itself there must ultimately be some part of the mechanism which is inaccessible to examination from within

11

(p. 292).

Per-

sonal consciousness is thus seen as an ongoing internal process, aspects
of which we are able to observe through various modes of awareness, yet
the essence of which remains below our awareness.

Evidence for such a

view comes from the work of Starker (1973; 1974) who has found that
certain qualitative dimensions of mental functioning are consistent in
dreams, daydreams, and other mental productions of an individual.
In this brief review of several reJated theories of consciousness,
imagery is seen as a process of cognitive representation which occurs
during the development of consciousness, which in turn serves to sustain
that consciousness.

The next chapter will further explore

6

consciousness in terms of two different, yet complementary, modes of
conscious experience.

l
CHAPTER III
TWO MODES OF CONSCIOUSNESS
THEORETICAL MODELS
There is a growing body of research which demonstrates that man
has two major modes of consciousness.

Each paragraph below will present

a particular researcher's theory concerning man's two modes of conscious
experience.

Although different terminology is employed by each of the

researchers, the underlying distinction between the two modes concerns
verbal and imaginal/spatial cognitive processes.
Deikman (1971) describes these modes in terms of a receptive mode,
oriented toward maximizing the intake of the environment, and an action
mode, oriented toward the manipulation of the environment.

Language is

the essence of the action mode, through which we can discriminate, analyze, and divide the world into objects which can then be acted upon.
Thus we manipulate our environment through language-mediated strategies.
However, the Whorfian hypothesis--that we are unable to think outside
our language structues--has relevance only for the action mode, suggesting that the receptive mode processes information non-verbally.
This bi-modal model presents different strategies for experiencing the
world, depending upon the extent of dominance of a particular mode.
Deikman (1971) concludes that the characteristic way an individual attends to stimuli, his/her attentive style, has important effects influencing the individual's conscious experience.

\

For instance, it is
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proposed that the action mode is characterized by focal attention and
object-based logic, whereas the receptive mode is characterized by
diffuse attention and paralogical thought processes.
Richardson (1969) devised a typology contrasting habitual visualizers and habitual verbalizers.
fairly concrete vivid imagery.

The habitual visualizer experiences
Such individuals may on occasion resort

to inner speech and engage in problem solving without being aware of
accompanying· imagery.

However, visual imagery is a frequent and spon-

taneous accompaniment to much of their thinking and to most of their
daydreaming.

Visual images arise easily and may be utilized deliber-

ately as a method of concretely representing some past, present, or
future event.

Habitual

verbalizers, on the other hand, experience weak

or vague concrete imagery with little or no visual imagery.

The ver-

balizer may express memory images, but visual imagery does not play a
significant role in cognitive functioning.

Problem solving is an image-

less process, though usually accompanied by inner speech.

"There may be

a predominance of kinaesthetic imagery from the larynx and tongue, and
some verbal and auditory imagery" (Richardson, 1969, p. 62).

The visual

and verbal modes of encoding, storing, and decoding information are
alternative strategies, though not mutually exclusive for most people.
However, preferred strategies develop in different individuals and in
extreme cases these become habitual with little switching from one
strategy to another.
Ornstein (1972) states that one of the most basic differences between individuals is between those who tend to employ the linear, verbal
mode and those who are less verbal, and more involved in spatial imagery.

9

He goes further in delineating these two modes by suggesting that differences between right and left hemispheric functioning may be the
basis to our understanding of the psychological and physiological mechanisms of the two major modes of consciousness.

Both the structure and

the function of the two cerebral hemispheres to some extent underlie
the two modes of consciousness which coexist within each of us.

The

left hemisphere is specialized for verbal and math functions, with an
analytical and logical orientation..

Its mode of operation is primarily

linear, processing information in a sequential manner.
sphere is specialized for holistic

mentat~on

The right hemi-

with a spatial orientation.

Its mode of operation is primarily simultaneous, processing information
in a relational manner.

In most ordinary activities, we simply alter-

nate between the two hemispheres, selecting the one appropriate for the
task and inhibiting the other.

However, some persons habitually prefer

one mode over the other.
Bower (1970) views the verbal and visual modes as different processing systems and suggests, as in the previous discussion, that the
systems might be functionally discriminated along hemispheric distinctions.

A verbal processing system, which is specialized for speech and

abstract information, may be primarily a left hemisphere function, while
a visual processing system, which is more adept with spatial and concrete information, might be predominantly associated with the right
hemisphere.
These theories have been speculative in nature thus far.

The next

section will concentrate on empirical evidence which supports the
theories just reviewed.
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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Neurophysiological research has contributed to this differentiation of a two processes theory by demonstrating that the mechanisms
subserving verbal and non-verbal processes are, to a considerable degree, distinct anatomically as well as functionally.

The first set of

evidence comes from research with lobectomy patients (Kimura, 1973;
Milner, 1968).

These investigations have shown that left hemisphere

lesions are associated with behavioral deficits that can be conceptualized as a loss in verbal symbolic abilities, whereas right hemisphere
lesions produce selected deficits in the individual's ability to process non-verbal information.
Another source of evidence comes from cerebral commissurotomy investigations (Bogen, 1969; Gazzaniga &Sperry, 1967; Nebes, 1974, 1978;
Sperry, 1973).

Since the two cerebral hemispheres were in essence

dissociated, the researchers were able to isolate and confine visual
information to one or the other hemisphere.

In this manner, the two

hemispheres were found to be neurophysiologically specialized to process
information in two different complementary modes.

The left hemisphere

processes information in a linear, sequential manner appropriate to
its specialities of verbal representation and rational thought.

The

right hemisphere processes input more as a patterned whole in a simultaneous manner, according to its specialized non-verbal or visual representation.
A recent discovery involving hemispheric functioning is that lateral eye movement (LEM) can be a reliable indication of a predominance
of activity in the cortical hemisphere

~ontralateral

to the direction of

11

the eye movement (Bakan, 1971; Day, 1967; Harnard, 1972; Kinsbourne,
1972; Kocel et al., 1972; Meskin & Singer,

1974).

Furthermore, the

direction of LEMs to left or right is relatively consistent for an individual, so that one can be classified as either a left or right mover
on the basis of predominant direction of eye movement.

Bakan (1971)

states that on the average, people make about 75% of their LEMs in one
direction, either left or right, though women·are less consistent in
the direction of LEMs than men.
It has also been found that consistent eye movement patterns are
associated with certain personal1tY traits and cognitive styles (Bakan,
1971; Day, 1967; Meskin &Singer, 1974) ..

The cognitive style of a left

mover is more likely to reflect the style of right hemisphere functioning, and consequently, the. cognitive style of a right mover is a reflection of left hemisphere functioning.

Thus, left movers (right hemi-

sphere activators) show greater use of images and more vivid imagery, an
internal focus on subjective experiences, are more fantasy-oriented,
more susceptible to hypnosis, have more humanistic interests with college majors in classical, humanistic areas, show more spatial ability,
and more emotionality.

Right movers (left hemisphere activators) are

more verbal, externally oriented to objective experience, analytical,
r~tional,

and are more likely to major in science and quantitative

areas.
Day (1967) states that this phenomenon of different cognitive
styles for left movers and right movers

suggests a theoretical view of

how selective attentional processes may be organized.
dualistic model of attentional processes.

He proposes a

Right movers show an
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externalized, objective, actively responsive distribution of attention,
whereas left movers exemplify an internalized, subjective, passively
expressive distribution of attention.

Recent evidence suggests that the

two hemispheres do function at different levels of arousal, with the
left hemisphere functioning at a higher level of arousal than the right
hemisphere (Bakan, 1971).

Also, EEG alpha waves, associated with a low

arousal state, are found in greater quantity over the right hemisphere.
Certain states of consciousness, such as daydreaming and hypnosis, are
also associated with relaxation and low arousal and might be associated
to a greater extent with right hemispheric functioning (Harnard, 1972).
The implication of these interrelationships is that a person who
makes more left LEMs,experiences more vivid imagery, has an internal
focus of attention on subjective experience, is more susceptible to
hypnosis, etc., is this way because his/her right hemisphere is relatively more domtnant in his/her total psychological functioning.

In the

case of a right mover, this would implicate the left hemisphere as a
more dominant force in the individual's psychological functioning.
Such stylistic differences are considered a reflection of differential
habitual activation of the left hemisphere (for right movers) associated with localization of verbal capacities, and the right hemisphere
(for left movers) associated with non-verbal, visual imagery and spatial
capacities.

The concept of two organizational modes is thus based on

the idea that psychological and.physiological activities are integrated
in the service of the total organism, and the functional attitude of the
organism is the crucial determinant of which mode is adopted (Deikman,
1971).

CHAPTER IV
IMAGERY AND VERBAL PROCESSES
FUNCTIONAL DISTINCTIONS
Restricting the discussion to imagery and verbal processes does
not imply that these are the only modes of representation in consciousness.

Rather, they are the most obvious modes and are most coTTDTionly

represented in the literature.

Imagery and verbal processes are dis-

tinguished primarily in terms of their functions as symbolic systems
(Paivio, 1971, 197lb).

Imagery involves non-verbal mental representa-

tions or modes of thought.

Unless otherwise specified, the term imagery

will be used in this context to denote non-verbal visual imagery.

The

verbal symbolic mode of thought is a process assumed to involve implicit
activity in an auditory-motor speech system.
Alan Paivio, one of the leading researchers in the area of imaginal and verbal symbolic processes, views the two processing systems as
functionally independent but partly interconnected cognitive systems
for encoding,

storing, organizing, transforming, and retrieving stimu-

lus information (Paivio, 1971, 197lb).

The term independence refers to

independent storage and independent processing within the two systems.
Information can be stored and processed in either the imaginal or the
verbal system, or in both simultaneously.

Neurophysiological evidence

for functional independence was cited previously.

Further evidence to

support the idea that visual and verbal information are dealt with in

\

1
J
~

l

14

distinct, modality-specific manners comes from the research on interference in same-modality tasks (Brooks, 1968; Paivio, 1975; Segal &
Fusella, 1969).

It was found, for instance, that memory (e.g.,

mnemonic) activity can go on in the imagery channel, while the verbal
channel is concurrently engaged in perceptual activity (e.g., listening), but the same channel cannot efficiently carry on both perceptual
and memory processing (Paivio, 1975).

The conclusion drawn from these

studies was that imagery mediation is indeed a process that involves
the visual system, whereas abstract verbal mediation implicates the
auditory system.

The two systems become interconnected, however,

through associative experience involving language and concrete objects
and events (Paivio, 197lb, 1973).

Very simply, words can be transformed

into images, non-verbal stimuli can be labeled, and transformations can
occur cognitively from images to implicit speech and vice versa.
The two processing systems are also assumed to differ functionally in regard to the nature of the information they are specialized to
handle, the way that information is organized into higher-order structures,

and the ease with which the cognitive infQrmation can be recog-

nized or transformed (Paivio, 1975).
Thus the imagery system is assumed to be specialized for relatively.
direct processing of information concerning concrete objects and
events; it organizes elementary units of information (images)
into higher-order structures that have a synchronous or spatial
character; and it is functionally dynamic and flexible in that the
organized cognitive infonnation can be quickly reorganized, manipulated, or transformed. The verbal system is specialized for dealing with abstract information involving linguistic units and
organizing such information into higher-order sequential structures.
(Paivio, 1975, p. 59).
The verbal system is not as flexible as the imagery system due to grammatical, logical, and sequential constraints (Richardson, 1969).

l
l
I
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A factor analytic study conducted by Paivio and Rogers sought to
determine the relations among individual differences in imaginal and
verbal processes (Paivio, 197lb).

The degree to wh{ch subjects habitu-

ally used verbal and imaginal modes of thought was assessed by an 86item true-false questionnaire.

Items were selected on an intuitive

basis with the assumption that individuals vary in their typical cognitive approaches to different tasks.

In this way symbolic habits as well

as abilities were measured.
The most encouraging implication of the factor structure is that
imaginal and verbal processes emerged as different cognitive
dimensions, just as they had in Thurstone's original work and
in Guilford's recent research on the structure of the intellect.
(Paivio, 197lb, p. 495)
Thus it appears that imagery and verbal processes can be differentiated not only in theory but empirically as well.

The following

section discusses the two modes in terms of operational distinctions.

EMPIRICAL APPROACH
Theoretical distinctions are only useful to the extent that verbal
and imaginal processes can be operationally distinguished.

In most of

his investigations, Paivio has employed one form or

of a paired-

an~ther

associate learning task in order to operationally distinguish the different variables involved in imagery and verbal processes (Paivio, 1965,
1967, 1968, 1969; Paivio &Csapo, 1969; Paivio &Foth, 1970; Paivio &
Madigan, 1968; Paivio & Yuille, 1969; Yuille & Paivio, 1968).

In this

way imagery and verbal processes serve a mediationary role for new data
to be encoded.

The most corrmon general interpretation of mediator ef-

fectiveness is in terms of transfer:

the use of mediators essentially
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involves the application of information in long-term memory storage to
the learning of new response units or new associations (Paivio, 197lb).
Thus,.when an individual uses mediators, he/she is taking advantage of
the pre-established representations or associative habits to construct
a more meaningful, andthereforemore available, relationship between
units.
The empirical approach to a PAL task involves three major classes
of independent variables.

One is concerned with stimulus attributes,

defined along an abstract-concrete dimension.

Thus, the noun-pairs used

in the paired-associate task vary in their image-evoking capacity, as
measured by subject's ratings or reaction time data.

Another variable

is experimental manipulation, which involves mnemonic instruction, presentation rate, and task demands, and is designed to increase or decrease the probability that imagery or verbal processes will be effectively used.

Individual differences in imaginal and verbal habits and

abilities defines the third variable, and is the most important for the
purpose of the present study.

All of the variables are designed to

affect the availability of one or the other symbolic processing system·
in a given task.
Paivio (1971, 197lb) concludes from evidence of recent investigations that both verbal and imaginal mediators greatly enhance learning
as compared to appropriate control conditions, but that they are sometimes differentially effective.

The differential effects of the two

classes of mediators can be analyzed in terms of concrete-abstract,
parallel-sequential, and dynamic-stati.c functional dimensions between
the two systems.
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On the concrete-abstract dimension, imagery mediation interacts
with item concreteness in such a way as to enhance imaginal association
to concrete stimuli more than to abstract stimuli.

Consequently, there

is a facilitating effect on learning when the items are concrete but
not when they are abstract.

The inferiority of imagery with abstract

noun-pairs is due to the difficulty in generating images for such pairs.
This is evidenced by significantly longer latencies for imagery than for
verbal mediators, as well as relatively more failures to produce images,
in the case of abstract noun-pairs.

As such, images are much less avail-

able for abstract than for concrete noun-pairs.

No such interaction

occurs in the case of verbal mediators, in that they are equally available for concrete or abstract nouns.

The research shows that imagery

mediators produce better recall than verbal mediators with concrete
noun-pairs, whereas verbal mediators are generally more effective with
abstract noun-pairs.

However, there are exceptions to this general

finding in that some individuals can use imagery effectively with abstract pairs, which would suggest that imagery processes in general
might be more available for these people (Paivio, 197lb).
The distinction between spatially parallel and sequential processing of information in imaginal and verbal symbolic systems implies that
imagery should be advantageous in memory tasks that involve spatial
organization of informational units or retrieval of spatial information
from memory, whereas verbal

pro~esses

should be superior in tasks that

require the sequential order of items to be remembered.

This functional

distinction may provide a partial explanation for the apparent superiority of imagery with concrete items.

With integrated images, information

l
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is associated and stored in parallel form.

The image can be quickly

scanned and decoded to yield a verbal response.

Verbal mediators as-

sociate and store information sequentially, which could result in a
greater memory load and a longer decoding process (Paivio, 197lb).
Neisser (1967) postulates that parallel processing of multi-faceted
information proceeds more quickly than sequential processing of the same
amount of information.
Paivio (197lb) suggests that images are particularly effective in
promoting

rapid and flexible associations while verbal processes give

them direction and organization.

This distinction might shed some

light on the fact that even though images are in some respects superior
to verbal mediation, they are also.particularly susceptible to decoding
errors under some conditions (Paivio, 1975; Yuille, 1973).

It also has

implications for the finding that imagery ability,is especially relevant
High imagers were found to be superior to low

in incidental learning.

imagers in their incidental recall of the irrelevant component of a
compound stimulus (Bower,

1972; Earnest & Paivio, 1969).

Imagery is

assumed to encode visual information literally, to some extent, whereas
verbal processes are more likely to encode information according to some
classification schema.

Thus, incidental cues are unlikely to be coded

into the verbal schemata, whereas such. cues would be more readily available to imagery processing (Paivio, 197lb; Sheehan, 1966).

In this re-

spect, imager.y is characteristic of autistic thinking in general and in
that context is free of logical or sequential constraints.

Verbal pro-

cesses, superimposed on such imagery; presumably contribute order and
direction.

19
It would appear, then, that we would be more efficient problem
solvers if we could utilize both forms of representation, both within
a problem and between types of problems.

In an early experiment involv-

ing "professional problem solvers," it was found that their thinking
showed constant alternations between abstract numerical and verbal
modes of thought on the one hand, and concrete imaging on the other
(Hyman & Anderson, 1956).

The advantage of such alternatism is that it

provides a basis for breaking an unproductive set toward the solution
to a problem.

Short (1953) also hypothesized that the "mixed" type of

representation has advantage when moving from the solution of a problem
where verbalization is more appropriate to the point where an ability
to visualize is especially useful.

However, using a stereognosis task,

Short and Walters (1954) found that better performances were achieved
by habitual verbalizers and habitual visualizers than by ·those who
switched between the two modes.

Thus is appears that the value of an

ability to switch modes needs to be further investigated.
The discussion which follows concerns the practical problem of
discovering criteria and employing reliable measurements to distinguish
subjects as imagers or verbalizers, who would in turn perform differentially on a variety of tasks.

Most researchers have relied on a variety

of tests involving spatial or verbal ability, or self-report measures
of such abilities.
consistent results.

However, these attempts have generally yielded inIn the present study, an individual's habitual

synbolic mode was measured by an ongoing mentation report.
sampl~d

Both time-

ongoing mentation reports and EEG-EOG recordings of hemisphere

activation were utilized.

\

In this way, a comaprison was made between
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the classification of imager or "verbalizer" and corresponding acti11

11

vation of left or right hemisphere.

It was expected that those classi-

fied as verbalizers on the basis of ongoing mentation would also prove
to be left hemisphere activators on the EEG-EOG measure.

Those classi-

fied as imagers would be expected to show a preference for right hemisphere activation.

Thus, the measure should provide a firm basis for

establishing a person's habitual symbolic mode.
A paired-associate task was used as a performance measure· of the
subject's ability to use imaginal or verbal processes.

.

Paivio (1971,

197lb) states that research is needed which incorporates relevant item
I

I

I,

attributes, instructional sets, and individual differences in a single
design.

The PAL task, as discussed in the procedure section, met these

requirements.

Paivio (197lb) found that associative strategies are only partly
controlled by experimental sets and that, over trials, subjects increasingly revert to associative habits
of the task items.
sets

aro~sed

by the semantic attributes

Due. to this difficulty of establishing persistent

to use mediating devices that are incongruent with the associa-

tive process most readily aroused by the nouns themselves, the PAL task
involved concrete nouns with imagery mediation, and abstract nouns with
verbal mediation.

It was assumed that imagers would perform somewhat

better on concrete-imagery tasks and that verbalizers would do better
with the abstract-verbal tasks.

Furthermore, on the trials which do

not specify a mnemonic strategy, it was expected that some subjects
would show a preference for either imagery or verbal mediation, depending on their habitual symbolic mode.

It was also expected that some
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individuals would not be classified in an either-or distinction, but
would form a mixed group.

Such individuals would be expected to show

a greater ability to switch back and forth in their symbolic modes,
according to task demands.
A third area of measurement was in the form of self-report questionnaires.

The results in the literature have been inconsistent in

relating self-report measures of imagery with performance measures of
imagery.

It would be expected that subjects who report more vivid

imagery would make more effective use of it in a memory task than those
who report poor imagery.

Yet,

N~isser

(cited in Paivio, 197lb) makes a

distinction between imagery as a process that represents spatial information effectively and imagery as a subjectively reported experience
whose vividness may be unrelated to its usefulness or accuracy.

In

fact, imagery, if uncontrolled, might be a hindrance rather than a help
(Richardson, 1972).

Thus Doob (1972) suggests that an interaction of

vividness and controllability might provide a more useful measure of the
adaptive utility of imagery.

Richardson (1969) suggests, in the context

of studies using the Betts vividness questionnaire and Gordon's test of
controllability, that the two variables may interact to produce predictable differences in performance.

Results of those studies showed some

success in the prediction of such behavior as imagemediatedmotor learning.

In the present research design, the Gordon test and Betts ques-

tionnaire were employed and results compared with the measures of symbolic habit and ability to see what, if any, correJations exist.

CHAPTER V
DESCRIPTION OF THE PRESENT STUDY
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
The purpose of the present study was to distinguish
11

11

imagers from
11

verbalizers who would in turn perform differentially on other mea-

sures.

11

The ongoing mentation report provided a basis for classifying

subjects according to their preferred symbolic mode.

The OMR reports

were coded for vividness of imagery by independent judges who rated each
mentation report on a scale from 0 (no content reported) to 3 (hallucinatory percentual content) (see Appendix A).

The criterion for classify-

ing subjects as verbalizers or imagers depended on at least 60% of the
mentation reports being coded as either conceptual or perceptual.

Also,

the EEG/EOG record was marked during the OMR so as to indicate each
time-sampled interruption.

Thus, eye movements during the 15-second

interval preceding the mentation report were recorded for each subject.
The criterion for classifying subjects as left movers or right movers
was defined by requiring at least 60% of a subject's LEMs to be made in
one direction, either left or right.

Meskin and Singer (1974) were able

to classify 42 of 48 subjects as left or right movers on the basis of
60% of their eye movements being made in one direction during a questionnaire interview.

The subjects who did not meet this criterion were

placed in a mixed mover group.
11

11

It was predicted that verbalizers

would show a predominance of right LEMs, thus implicating the left
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hemisphere.

Consequently, imagers were expected to show a predominance

of left LEMs, indicating right hemisphere activation.
The PAL task was a measure of the number of concrete and abstract
nouns recalled by each subject. !twas assumed that the difference between recall test performance in trials II and III would be a function
of individual differences (i.e., whether subjects were imagers or verbalizers).

It was predicted that overall performance on trial II

(concrete/imagery) would be superior to the results on trial III (abstract/verbal), but that imagers would perform better than verbalizers
on this task.

It was expected that verbalizers would perform better

than imagers on trial III.

Thus, trials II and III measured a subject's

ability to use imagery and verbal mediation on the basis of number of
nouns recalled.
The purpose in using the Betts questionnaire, Gordon's test, and
IPI visual imagery scale, was to see what, if any,_ correlations exist
between self-report measures of imagery vividness/controllability and
the previous measures of imagery and verbal habits and abilities.

It

would be expected that those subjects who rate high on self-report imagery scales would also rate high on spontaneous vivid imagery as coded
by the OMR.
METHOD
Subjects
Twenty-five subjects were recruited from undergraduate psychology
courses at Portland State University.

A subject's participation was

related to his/her grade in a course only to the extent that extra
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credit was offered by some instructors.
upon completion of all measures.

Each subject was paid $5.00

Due to equipment failure and subject

recidivism, the final N for this study was 16:

4 males and 12 females.

An initial interview was employed to screen for psychiatric disturbance, as well as to gather biographical data.

Due to the recommen-

dation for use of the Imaginal Processes Inventory, only native Englishspeaking subjects were used.· Also, left-handedness was screened out
due to mixed hemisphere organization (Corballes & Beale, 1976).
The age range of the sample was 19 to 37 years, mean age was 25,
mode was 23, standard deviation was 5.28.
Caucasian.

All of the subjects were

Fifteen of the subjects were full-time summer students.

One subject was not enrolled in classes for the summer, but was working
as a research assistant in the Department of Psychology.

Seven subjects

stated an academic major in Psychology, two in Education, two in Business, two in General Studies, and one each in Nursing, Biology, and
Social Work.
Eleven of the subjects stated an occupation.

Five had part-time

clerical/office jobs, one was an unemployed secretary/tutor, one a
full-time machinist, two manual laborers (one employed part-time, one
unemployed), one part-time musician/promoter, and one part-time salesperson.

The remaining subjects did not report an occupation and were

not workJng at the time of the study.
Procedures
The tasks were divided into two sessions, each of which took about
two hours for the subject to complete.

The first session was conducted

with each subject individually; the second session was conducted with
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groups of subjects.

The time of day that the sessions were scheduled

depended on the availability of the subject.
Session One.

This session consisted of the OMR, the PAL, and the

Betts and Gordon questionnaires.
The procedures used for the OMR approximated as closely as possible (based on the published article) those procedures employed by
Foulkes and Fleisher (1975).

The sessions were conducted at various

times during the day between the hours of 9:00 A.M. and 8:00 P.M.

Two

OMRs occurred at 9:00 A.M., six at noon, six at 3:00 P.M., and two at
6:00 P.M.

The room was moderately illuminated by two table lamps (150 and
75 watts), each located

approx~mately

six feet from the subject.

No

attempt was made to eliminate incidental sounds from the hallway, although most subjects commented on the noise made by the ventilation
system of the building.
white noise.

The noise was one of rushing air, and resembled

Every attempt was made to provide a setting which was

similar to one encountered in everyday situations of relaxation.
Subjects were oriented to the task as a daytime practice session
for the establishment of waking baseline responses to a structured interview designed for use in sleep research.

The nature of sleep re-

search was described to the subject (i.e., monitoring of sleep, awakenings, and use-of the interview questions).

It was pointed out to the

subject that the questions may not apply too well to waking experiences.
See Appendix B for the script used for this orientation.
Electrode placements for EEG and EOG monitoring were then made.
Frontal placements were used for the EEG, and EOG placements were made

\

1

I
;
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according to the criteria outlined in Rechtschaffen and Kales (1968).
The subject was shown a copy of the questionnaire to be used in reporting mentation.

See Appendix C for a list of these questions.

The ex-

perimenter reviewed each question with the subject to ensure understanding.

During this time, a second experimenter calibrated the physiograph

in the next room.
The subject was then asked to lie down and relax but to stay
awake.

It was suggested that the subject might want to close his eyes

to promote relaxation, but that this was not a requirement.

The experi-

menter than left the room and allowed a five-minute adaptation period
before beginning the timed interruptions.

Subjects remained in this re-

laxed state for 45 to 60 minutes, during which time the experimenter,
isolated in the next room, interrupted the subject at six randomly
selected times.

The interruptions ranged from one to nine minutes after

the end of the previous interview (adaptation period or mentation report).

The experimenter called the subject's name over a speaker sys-

tem, and went through the questions contained in Appendix C.
The subject's answers were recorded on magnetic tape, transcribed
on individual scoring sheets, randomly ordered, and given to two judges
to rate for the content areas under study.
In ·order to make comparisons with previous research, Regressivity
and Reality Contact were scored for OMR.

In order to make comparisons

with other measures used in -this study, the reports were rated for emotional tone, outcome, achievement, aggression, sex, bizarreness, and
vividness.

For the purpose of the present study, the vividness scale

was utilized to analyze each subject's report as to a predominance of

,
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visual or verbal mentation, thus leading to a preliminary classification of subjects as

11

imagers 11 or. 11 verbalizers. 11

Vividness of imagery

was assessed by a modification of the Dreamlike Fantasy scale (Foulkes,
1971; Foulkes, Spear, and Symonds, 1966).

This scale consists of rat-

ing the report from 0 (no content reported, feels mind was blank) to 7
(perceptual content which is hallucinatory).

The modified scale, which

removes any mention of the bizarreness of the image, ranges in value
from 0 to 3, using the same end-points as the full scale.

The modified

scale is presented in Appendix A.
A-four-channel physiograph (E &M Instruments, Model 4-A) was used
to monitor EEG and EOG for the entire relaxation period.

The paper

speed was 1.0 cm/sec, the minimum speed recommended by Rechtschaffen and
Kales (1968) for reliable recording of EOG and EEG.

Selective filtering

was set at 30 Hz, except during periods of interference (60-cycle fluctuations, subject muscle tension, etc.) at which times the filter was
set at 10 Hz.

Pen deflection ranged from 20 OmV/cm when the filter was

set on 30 Hz, to 50 OmV/cm when the filter was set at 10 Hz.
The physiograph record was used to determine lateral eye movements
for each subject.

This record was then used in classifying subjects as

having a preference for left or right hemisphere activation.

The EEG

and EOG measures also provided a basis for judging whether or not the
subject was awake or asleep at the time of the mentation report.
rolling eye movement was the primary indicator of sleep onset.
tionally, a report from the subject that he/she was
11

11

drowsy,

11

Slow,
Addi-

"drifting

off , or in "light sleep" (question 10) was used as a criterion.

When

both the physiological and subjective assessment coincided in indicating
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sleep onset, the report obtained was discarded.

Thus, the interruptions

scored and reported were obtained from waking subjects.
The paired-associate learning task (PAL) used a revision of the
procedure employed by Yuille and Paivio (1968).

Al1 subjects were pre-

sented a standard set of procedural instructions which specified that
the experiment was concerned with learning noun-pairs (see Appendix D).
Each noun-pair was presented manually by the experimenter at a constant
rate of 6 seconds per card.

Each subject participated in four separate

paired-associate learning trials, each trial consisting of a list of
10 noun-pairs.

During this time, the subject was continuously monitored

by EEG and EOG recordings.
The conditions for trial I excluded prior mnemonic instructions
and were identical for all subjects.
first list of noun-pairs.

Each subject was presented the

This list consisted of five concrete and

five abstract noun-pairs presented in random order.

This was followed

by a recall test, with the experimenter presenting the stimulus nourt and
the subject recalling and writing the response noun.

The subject then

filled out a brief questionnaire describing how he/she remembered the
noun-pairs.

Tiral I yielded a baseline measure of PAL performance for

all subjects.
The conditions for trials II and III included two different
mnemonic instructions (imagery and verbal) and two corresponding PA
lists (concrete and abstract, respectively).

The order of sequence for

trials II and III was counterbalanced so that half the subjects were
randomly selected to receive trial II first and trial III second.
remaining half received trial III first and trial II second.

The
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For trial II, each subject was told that he/she was going to learn
a mnemonic technique which would help him/her to remember word lists.
The subject then listened to a set of standardized imagery instructions
describing how to combine each noun-pair by forming a mental image, or
picture, of the appropriate objects together (see Appendix D).

Each

subject then practiced the technique with two noun-pairs, drawing the
mental image on paper so that the subject's understanding of the imagery
instructions could be verified.
the drawing was unimportant.

It was emphasized that the quality of

The subject was then presented with a

list of 10 concrete noun-pairs,

fol~owed

by a recall test as in trial I.

This was followed by the questionnaire.
The procedure for trial III was the same as in trial II, the difference being that an abstract word list was employed and the subjects
were instructed to use a verbal mnemonic strategy.

Each subject was in-

structed to construct a sentence or phrase for each noun-pair in which
the nouns were embedded and associated in some manner (see Appendix D).
On the two practice noun-pairs, the subject was asked to write the mediating phrase on paper, again to insure the subject's understanding of
the technique.

The questionaire followed the recall test, as in trials

I and II.
The conditions of trial IV repeated those of trial I.

The sub-

ject received no mnemonic instruction and was told to perform the task
in the easiest manner.

The PA list, as in trial I, consisted of five

concrete and five abstract noun-pairs presented in random order, followed by a recall test and questionnaire.
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The nouns in the four paired-associate lists (10 word pairs each)
were selected from a list of 925 nouns with norms for concreteness (C),
imagery (I}, and meaningfulness (Paivio, Yuille, and Madrigan, 1968).
See Appendix E for PA lists.

The concrete list consisted of 20 randomly

paired nouns rated high on C and I (means approximately matched across
words).

The abstract list consisted of 20 randomly paired nouns rated

low on C. and I (means approximately matched).

The frequency of usage

for all nouns was approximately matched across lists (Thorndike &Lorge,
1944).

Each word pair was typed in upper case letters on an unlined

3 x 5 card.
11

11

The self-report, post-trial questionnaire consisted of two parts
(see Appendix F).

The first part consisted of two questions with cor-

responding 7-point scales.

The scale for question 1 (how easy or diffi-

cult the subject found the instructed mnemonic strategy) was defined by
1 (very easy) to 7 (very difficult).

The scale for question 2 (how

often the subject used the instructed technique) was defined by l (none
of the pairs) to 7 (all of the pairs).

The second part contained a list

of the noun-pairs employed in the preceding trial, along with instructions for the subject to draw (trial II) or write (trial III) the
mnemonic mediation actually used to remember each noun-pair.
The Betts and Gordon questionnaires were administered after completion of the PAL.
imagery.

The Betts is a subjective measure of vividness of

Sheehan's shortened version of the Betts was used, as it ap-

pears in Richardson (1969). ·It contains seven subscales which require
the subject to rate the clarity and vividness of specific images across
the different sense modalities:

visual, auditory, tactile, kinesthetic,
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taste, smell, and bodily sensations.

All subtests use a rating scale

from 1 to 7, with a rating of 1 representing images which are ''perfectly
clear and as vivid as the actual experience" and a rating of 7 representing "no image present at all, you only know that you are thinking
of the object."
The Gordon test of imagery controllability, as revised by Richardson (1972) and adapted for this study, followed the Betts questionnaire
(see Appendix H).

The subject was instructed to visualize a specific

image in each of the sense modalities listed above, and was then asked
to change the image in a specific way.

The subject was then asked to

rate his/her ability to visualize the requested scene by indicating a
rating of yes or no.

The instructions emphasize ability to control and

change imagery, rather than the vividness of the imagery.

The Gordon

test and Betts questionnaire were administered on an individual basis as
advised by Richardson (1972).
Session Two.

This session consisted of group administration of

the Thematic Apperception Test and the Imaginal Processes Inventory, as
well as debriefing of subjects and payment for their services.
The subjects were asked to respond to six TAT cards (4, 7BM, 10,
13MF, 14, and 20) in a session conducted by the experimenter.

The

cards were selected to yield a variety of themes, according to the normative data reported by Eron (1950).

The cards were also selected as

moderately ambiguous, according to the list provided by Bijou and
Kenney ( 1951).
The cards were projected on a screen with an overhead projector,
each card being projected for one minute.

\

The subjects were given five

l
I

l
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minutes to write their responses.

The stories thus obtained were coded

by two independent judges for the same categories, using the same criteria as the OMR.
TAT stories.

Regressivity and reality contact were ·not scored for

The latter two measures are scored only for the purpose of

comparing the results of Study II with the findings of Foulkes and
Fleisher (1975).
When instructing the subjects, the experimenter made no reference
to the purpose of the test.
pects of the story:

The subjects were asked to write three as-

(1) what is going on in the scene? (2) what led up

to the scene? and (3) what will happen after the scene, or what will
the outcome be?
Upon completion of the TAT, each subject was asked to complete
the IP!.

The !PI is a 344-item test to which the subject responds on

a 5-point Likert scale.

It assesses 28 aspects of daydreaming.

of the 28 subscales is located in Appendix I.
only the visual imagery scale was used.

A list

In the present study,

CHAPTER VI
RESULTS
The criterion for significance of results will be set at the .05
level for two-tailed tests unless otherwise specified.

The first hy-

pothesis postulated that verbalizers would show a predominance of right
LEMs and imagers a predominance of left LEMs. In a chi 2 comparison of
the eye movement classification with the imager/verbalizer classifica.tion, the prediction was not supported (chi 2 = 5.827, df = 4) (see
Table I) ..

TABLE I
SUBJECT-BY-SUBJECT ANALYSIS OF CLASSIFICATION BY EYE MOVEMENT AS
COMPARED WITH CLASSIFICATION BY TYPE OF REPORT
Type of Report
Imager

Left

Eve Movement
Right

5

1

3

9

Verbalizer

4

2

0

6

Mixed

0

0

1

l

9

3

4

16

Chi

2

Mixed

Row Total

was also calculated for the individual OMR reports based on

perceptual/conceptual ratings, and eye movement direction, which was
used as a basis for the previously

m~ntioned

classifications.

Again

there was no significant relationship between type of report and
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direction of eye movements (chi 2

= 1.42, df = 1). See Table II for this

comparison. In analyzing percentages of LEM direction ( 60% left or
right) to type of report, it was found that LEMs corresponding to perceptual reports are 66% to the left, which is in the predicted direction.
It is important to note, however, that 72% of all eye movements were to
the left (see Table II).

Thus, the majority of all LEMs, regardless of

type of report, were to the left.

Also, 60% of all eye movements re-

gardless of direction, coincided with perceptual reports.
g~neral

T~us,

LEMs in

were found to be associated with perceptual reports.
TABLE II

REPORT-BY-REPORT COMPARISON OF EYE MOVEMENTS BY TYPE OF REPORT
Type of Report
Perceptual
Conceptual

Eve
- Movement
>60% Right
>60% Left
27/40%
14/21%
22/32%

5/07%

48/72%

19/28%

Row Total
41/60%
27/40%
68

The second hypothesis concerned recall of concrete and abstract
nouns on trials II and III, respectively, of the PAL task.
dictions were made in relation to this hypothesis.

Three pre-

The first assumption

tested was that overall performance on trial II would be superior to
trial III performance for both verbalizers and imagers.

To compare

trials II and III within groups, an ANOVA for repeated measures was employed.

The prediction was supported for verbalizers, F (1,5) = 18.75,

E. .01, and approached significance at the .01 level for imagers, F (1,8)

= 10.583. A second prediction, that imagers would perform better than
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verbalizers on trial II, was tested using a t-test for independent
means.

The results did not support the expected difference in perfor-

mance between imagers and verbalizers on trial II, t (13)

= .487. The

third prediction, that verbalizers would perform better than imagers on
trial III, was again tested using a t-test for independent means.
results were significant, t (13)
tion.

The

= 2.63, but not in the predicted direc-

Rather, imagers performed significantly better than verbalizers

on trial III.

Means and standard deviations are presented in Table III.
TABLE III

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR !MAGERS AND VERBALIZERS
ON' TRIALS II AND III OF THE PAL TASK
Tri a1 II

Trial III

Classification
Image rs

x

SD

x

8.888

1.166

5.000

SD
3. 182

Verbalizers

8.666

1.033

3.666

3.204

The last analysis concerns possible correlations between selfreport measures of imagery (Betts, Gordon, IPI) to rated vividness on
the OMR reports.

Reliability of.the two judges' ratings on vividness

was .914 (.E_ < .001).

Using Pearson's r_, it was found that OMR reports

correlate significantly with the IPI scale of visual imagery (.!:,
df

= 14,

.Q. < .001).

There was no correlation between OMR reported

vividness and the Betts scale (..!:.
(r_

= .065,

Table IV.

df

= 14).

= .815,

= .281, df = 14), or the Gordon test

Means and standard deviations are presented in
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TABLE IV
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR OMR, IPI, BETTS, AND GORDON
Measure
OMR

x
1. 856

SD
0.499

IPI

37.750

7.576

Betts

87.313

21. 216

Gordon

3.875

1. 668

CHAPTER VII
DISCUSSION
The lack of concordance between subjects' classification by type
of report and classification by eye movement direction could be due to
several factors.

First, the eye movement classification was a difficult

one to make from the EOG recordings.

Only one channel -of the physio-

graph was allotted to the two EOG electrodes in the present study.
After completion of the study, a reference for Rechtschaffen and Kales
(1968) was found which states that when specific information about
direction and size of eye movement is required, at least two channels
are necessary for recording eye movement.

This is to eliminate confu-

sion between eye movement potentials and other artifacts.

Thus, judg-

ments of direction of eye movement based on this study's EOG recordings
might be inaccurate.

For the purpose of conservation, paper speed was

run at 1.0 cm per second, which is the minimal speed recommended by
Rechtschaffen and Kales (1968).

A higher speed, such as 2.0 cm per

second, might yield a more reliable recording of direction of LEMs.
Also, the 15-second interval was an arbitrarily chosen time interval in
which to make eye movement judgments, and perhaps a shorter interval
preceding the interruption would be more appropriate.
of course, that there
measures.

It is possible,

is no significant correlation between the two

Paivio (1973) states that neither EEG recordings nor LEMs

have been found to correlate consistently with imagery.

\

.

Further
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research controlling for the above mentioned deficiencies in the apparatus and technique would be necessary before any conclusive statements
could be made about classifying subjects according to verbal report measures as compared to physiological measures.
Another factor to be controlled for is sex of subject.

An equal

distribution of males to females would be useful in analyzing data from
this research.

Four males and 12 .females were included in this study.

The breakdown of males and females, classification by type of report,
and classification by eye movement direction, appears in Table V.
TABLE V
BREAKDOWN OF MALES AND FEMALES ACCORDING TO CLASSIFICATIONS BY TYPE
OF REPORT AND BY EYE MOVEMENT DIRECTION
Measure
Report

Eye Movement

Classification
Image rs
Verba 1i zers
Mixed

Males
1

Females

3

3

0

1

Left movers
Right movers
Mixed

4

5

0

3

0

4

8

Classification by type of report and classification by eye movement direction was consistent for 50% of the subjects (imagers/left
movers and verbalizers/right movers).
from the imager

cla~sification

Three female subjects changed

by type of report to the mixed classifi-

cation by eye movement direction.

This is consistent with previous re-

search findings that females are not as frequently left movers or right
movers when compared to males.

Rather, they are more likely to move

their eyes in both directions and thus be classified in the mixed
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group (Bakan, 1971).

Due to this finding, some researchers are re-

stricting their population to males.· However, having an equal distribution of males to females might allow such trends to surface.
In reviewing Table V, it can be seen that three of the males
classified by type of report as verbalizers changed to the left mover
classification based on eye movement direction.

This could be due to

previously mentioned artifacts in the eye movement recording itself.
Since males are stereotypically thought of as being more verbal, analytical, and logical, the first classification seems to present a more accurate classification.

However, the left mover classification of the

four males in this study might be an accurate representation.

Further

research using more precise measurements and a larger population of
males is needed before any definitive statements can be made.

Two of

the female subjects also switched classification in opposite directions
of each other, so that it is not obvious in the distribution of numbers
in Table V.
The second hypothesis concerned the differential performance of
imagers and verbalizers on trials II and III of the PAL task.

Data from

this study did not support the predictions that imagers would perform
superior to verbalizers on trial II and that verbalizers would perform
superior to imagers on trial III.

Paivio (1971) summarizes that:

. . . individual differences in symbolic abilities are manifested
·in performance differences when cues for the relevant reactions
are not readily available in the stimulus situation but must be
supplied by the subject. (p. 503)
Thus, the superiority of high imagery subjects manifests itself in their
imaginal-associative reactions to abstract words, which are not ordinarily effective stimuli for image arousal. This is also true for
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imagery subjects involved in perceptual recognition of flashed stimuli,
especially stimuli that are particularly relevant to their ability
(i.e., pictures).

On the other hand, subjects with high verbal ability

show superiority under the impoverished stimulus conditions involved in
tachistoscope recognition and when the stimulus words are relatively
unfamiliar.

The PAL task in the present study was not designed to ac-

centuate these differences, which could be one reason for a lack of
findings in the predicted direction.
However, this does not explain the apparent superiority of imagers
over verbalizers on the abstract/verbal trial III.
fit into Paivio's Dual Coding Hypothesis (1972).

This finding would
According to this

hypothesis, high imagery conditions are so effective in learning and
memory because· they increase the probability that both imagery and verbal processes will play a mediational role in item·retrieval.

Thus,

people who report vivid imagery can utilize a source of information not
available to vague imagers.

This implies that even if the verbal code

is forgotten, the availabl.lity of imagery as an alternative mediator
allows reconstruction of the target item.

In this sense, the imager

has two mediational systems potentially available, rather than one.
This theory is speculative and is presented only as one of many possible
explanations for the observed superior performance of the imagers over
the verbalizers on trial III.

It should be noted that the observed dif-

ferences in performance might also be due to error in the initial
classification of subjects as imagers and verbalizers.
The third finding was that the Betts and Gordon self-report measures do not correlate with spontaneous vividness as measured by the

l
I!
l
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OMR, but that the IPI visual imagery scale does.
to the IPI scale are necessary.

Two co1TU11ents relating

First, the sample size in the present

study is smaller than that typically used for normative data on the
IPI scales.

Second, the IPI scales are not typically used independent

of one another for data analysis in that factor analytic studies have
demonstrated high loadings on three factors (Singer &Antrobus, 1972,
1963).

Thus, any conclusions based on the IPI scale used in this manner

must be tentative.

With this in mind, possible explanations for the

OMR correlation with IPI scales and lack of correlation with the Betts
and Gordon will be explored.

The main consideration is that this dif-

ference is due to the different nature of the measures themselves.

This

idea has been postulated by several researchers and will be reviewed
in the following paragraph.
Paivio (1971) makes a conceptual distinction between two types of
imagery ability:

one tied closely to perception and short-term memory

for concrete events, and the other tied closely to words as conditional
stimuli for memory images.

This distinction was supported by Paivio

and Roger's factor-analytic study in which the spatial ability and the
verbal tests of imagery defined different factors (Paivio, 1971).

This

distinction is similar to one made by Neisser (as cited in Paivio, 1971)
who discriminates between imagery as a process that represents spatial
information effectively and imagery as a subjective (verbally reported)
experience whose vividness may be unrelated to its usefulness or accuracy.

In another factor-analytic study of imagery tests, it was sug-

gested that introspective reports and objective tests of imagery cannot
be used to substitute for one another:

objective tests provide

l
I
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measures of abilities that may be quite different from those provided by
introspective reports {DiVesta, Ingersoll, &Sunshine, 1971).

Starker

(1974) evaluated how the active, volitional, imagery mode (as measured
by the Betts and by visual imagery in response to stimulus words) related to the passive, spontaneous experience of imagery (as measured by
the IPI vividness scale and by dream recall).

Results of the study

demonstrated a consistency within the two modes of imagery in terms of
vividness.

However, the relationship between imagery modes was less

clear, showing a real difference but allowing for some overlap.
Starker (1974) suggests that the active/volitional and passive/spontaneous imagery modes are experienced differentially and are likely to
follow different dynamic laws.
Although these researchers use different terminology, they are
all making an important basic distinction between different types of
imagery.

This distinction can be further applied to the present study.

The Betts and the Gordon direct a subject to image a certain object, and
thus measure vividness of imagery of a volitional nature formed on demand.

The IPI visual imagery scale simply inquires into a subject's

everyday imagery, and is thus a measure of naturally occurring, spontaneous imagery.

The IPI scale is therefore more closely related to a

spontaneous report of imagery as measured by the OMR.

The Betts and

Gordon could very well be measuring another aspect of the imagery process, which would explain their lack of correlation with spontaneous
imagery measures.

CHAPTER VIII
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This study has highlighted several implications for future research.

The present study could be divided into two projects:

(1) classification of subjects as imagers or verbalizers by several
different measures, and (2) a validity study of several different measures of visual imagery.
The first study would involve classifying subjects as imagers or
verbalizers on the basis of OMRs, and comparing that classification with
the EOG measure of direction of eye movement (utilizing two channels of
the physiograph,

increased paper speed, etc.).

Several OMR sessions

should be scheduled at different times during the day.

The question-

naire which appears in Appendix C should be developed specifically for
the purpose of judging mentation reports as either perceptual or conceptual.

Future research might also include olfactory, kinesthetic, and

other imagery modes.

An additional measure which differentiates imagi-

nal and verbal habits and abilities, such as Paivio and Roger's questionnaire (Paivio, 1971), might also prove useful.

This type of mea-

sure, which probes into a subject's everyday mentation, should yield
consistent results with the OMR, which measures spontaneous, ongoing
mentation.
A second study could then involve different types of measurements
for imagery ability.

\

It was concluded in the present study that the
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Betts and Gordon questionnaires were tapping different aspects of the
imagery process than were the IPI visual imagery scale and the OMR.
This distinction is important for future research in the area of imagery, as one measurement cannot necessarily be substituted for another.
This finding is especially relevant when comparing the results of different studies involving measurements of imagery processes.

Future re-

search should concentrate on delineating between the various measurements involving imagery.

\
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APPENDIX A
RATING SCALE FOR VIVIDNESS
0
1

No content reported, feels mind was blank.
Conceptual content-- 11 ! was thinking about different shades of
·yellow, like a banana and a lemon are different yellows. I
didn't really see the colors, I was just thinking about them being
different.
11

2

Perceptual content, non-hallucinatory (subject knows
image was not real)-- 11 ! was looking at a lemon and a
noticing the difference in shades of yellow. I knew
just making up these images, but it seemed easier to
the yellow differences by imagining some examples.

that the
banana and
that I was
think about

11

3

Perceptual content, halludnatory (subject believed, at the time
of the experience, that the image was real)-- I was looking at a
lemon and a banana and comparing the differences in shades of
yellow. They seemed so real that I could reach out and touch
them.
11

11

(This scale is adapated from the Dreamlike Fantasy Scale as it
appears in Foulkes, Spear, and Symonds, 1966.)

APPENDIX B
ORIENTATION SCRIPT--OMR
Our studies usually involve waking subjects up from a state of
sleep and asking them to report mental experiences which occurred just
prior to their arousal. Today you are being asked to serve in a study
which is a waking control for these experiments. The difference is that
we are asking you to relax, but stay awake, during the recording session.
As in nighttime studies, we will call you at various times during
the recording period and ask you for an account of the mental experience
passing through your mind before the experimenter's call. If you do not
wish to report your thoughts for any reason, that's okay. Just tell the
experimenter that you would rather not talk about the mental experience.
We do two kinds of sleep studies. One type involves comparing reports obtained from different stages of sleep, of which there are
five
(Experimenter describes the progression of sleep stages, NREM
1-4 , and REM . )
Since sleep stages are physiological events with a duration of many minutes, subjects' reports of their mental experiences do not have to be
identified precisely as having occurred just before their awakening.
Sometimes the thoughts cover several minutes, or long periods of time
before the awakening, as in the report of a long, involved dream.
The other kind of sleep study attempts to correlate mental experiences with much more brief physiological events, like some quality of
brain wave activity. In these studies, subjects are asked to try to
recount only the very last mental experience they had before their
awakening, since only that one could meaningfully be correlated with a
physiological event which happened only a second or two before the
awakening.
The present study is a control for both kinds of sleep study.
Thus, when we call you name today and ask you for an account of your
waking mental experiences, we want you to describe only the very last
thing in your mind before you heard your name called. The experimenter
will ask you a seri~s of questions about that brief mental experience.
After these questions, the experimenter will ask you to relate the
thoughts which led up to the mental experience. Again, if you do not
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wish to talk about any thought, or any aspect of a thought, just tell
the experimenter. She will not question you about this.
Since this is a control for sleep experiments, the interview we
will use is the same one we use when subjects tell us their dreams.

Thus, its questions may not always apply too well to the kinds of experiences you have when awake.
(This script is adapted from Foulkes and Fleisher, 1975.)

APPENDIX C
INTERVIEW--OMR
1. What was the very last thing going through your mind just before I called you?
2. Was it visual? What could you see? Were you simply seeing
something without reflecting on it or were you actively thinking or reflecting about what you were seeing?
3. Was it auditory? What could you hear? Were you simply hearing something without reflecting on it or were you actively thinking or
reflecting about what you were hearing?
4. Which type of imagery predominated, what you could see or what
you could hear?
5.

Did you have any feelings or emotions during this experience?

6. (Omitted for experiences not involving imagining, such as
eyes-open perceptions or unfanciful thoughts) At the time you sensed
these things, did you feel that they were really happening, or did you
know at the time that these were just things that you were making up in
your mind?
7. At the time you thought these things, were you aware that you
were here in the laboratory, lying in your bed?
8. Did you feel like you were voluntarily controlling the nature
of your thoughts in the sense that you could stop them if you wanted
to, or was it more like they were just "happening" to you?
9. How well would you say that you can remember exactly what was
happening just before I called you: very well, fairly well, or not too
well at all?
10. Just before I called you, would you say that you were:
awake and alert, awake and relaxed, awake but drowsy, drifting off to
sleep, in light sleep, or in deep sleep?
11. What can you remember of the sequence of thoughts which led
up to the brief mental experience you have just described?
(This questionnaire is adapted from Foulkes and Fleisher, 1975.)

\

APPENDIX D
PAL INSTRUCTIONS
Trial I: This experiment is concerned with the learning of noun
pairs. I will hold a 3 x 5 card in front of you, as such. You are
to read the two words that are typed on the card, and try to remember
them. You will have 6 seconds to look at the card, then I will turn
the card face down on the table, like this. There will be a 2-second
break, then I will present the next card for 6 seconds, and so on until
10 cards have been presented. After all 10 cards have been presented,
I will go back through and present the first word from each card that
you saw, like this, and you will have 6 seconds to write the word-pair
that went with the word you see on this card. You are to write your
answer on the 3 x 5 card in front of you. As soon as 6 seconds is up,
I will call time and you are to turn over the top card, regardless of
whether or not you have written an answer. You are not expected to
remember all of the words. Just write down the ones that you do remember. Do you have any questions? Are you ready to begin?
11

11

11

11

Trial II: Now I am going to teach you a mnemonic device to help
you remember each word-pair. What I want you to do is to form an image,
or mental picture, of the two words you see on each card. For example,
with this card you might form an image of cattle grazing in a meadow.
Then when I present the card with just the word cattle, you will
bring the image to mind of cattle grazing in a meadow, and thus remember
the word "meadow" . . .
11

11

Trial III: I am now going to teach you a different mnemonic device to help you remember each word pair .. What I want you to do is to
construct a sentence or phrase for each word-pair in which the two
words are embedded and associated in some way. For example, with this
card you might form a phrase such as "my mood is full of hope.
Then
when I present the card with just the word mood, you would bring the
phrase "my mood is full of hope 11 to mind, and then write 11 hope 11 as
your answer . .
11

11

11

Trial IV: This time I waht you to remember th·e word-pairs in
whatever manner is easiest for you . . .

APPENDIX E
PAL WORD LIST

Trial I
hotel
house
power
dream
c1ock
fault
pride
apple
horse
truth

-

ticket
potato
spirit
memory
forest
genius
theory
street
fl ewer
misery

Trial III
moment
theory
heaven
moral
origin
belief
advice
chance
shame
spirit

- opinion
- impulse
- loyalty
- silence
- freedom
- science
- quality
- thought
- justice
-·ability

Tri a1 II
child
water
dress
flood
woman
arrow
paper
table
piano
shoes

-

garden
penci 1
factory
co 11 ege
library
painter
machine
village
officer
diamond

Trial IV
truck
money
charm
humor
style
month
candy
honor
insect
ocean

-

priest
bullet
safety
method
pledge
trouble
window
hatred
hammer
letter

APPENDIX F
PAL QUESTIONNAIRE
1.

How easy/difficult was this task for you?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

very
difficult

very
easy

2. How often did you use the imagery/verbal mediation to remember
the word-pairs (applicable for Trials II and III, respectively)?
1

none of
the pairs

3

4

5

6

6

7

all of
the pairs

Indicate how you remembered each of the word-pairs listed below
Trial II:

Please draw the image used to remember each of the
word-pairs, if applicable. The quality of the drawing is unimportant; a brief sketch will be sufficient.

Trial III:

Please write the verbal association used to remember
each word-pair, if applicable.

(This questionnaire is adapted from Paivio, 1968.)

]
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APPENDIX G
BETTS QUESTIONNAIRE
Test Instructions. The aim of this test is to determine the
vividness of your imagery. The items of the test will bring certain
images to your mind. You are to· rate the vividness of each image by
reference to the accompanying rating scale, which is shown below. For
example, if your image is "vague and dim," you give it a rating of 5.
Record your answer in the brackets provided after each item. Just
write the appropriate number after each item. Before you turn to the
items on the next page, familiarize yourself with the different categories on the rating scale. Throughout the test, refer to the rating
scale when judging the vividness of each image. A copy of the rating
scale will be printed on each page. Please do not turn to the next
page until you have completed the items on the page you are doing, and
do not turn back to check on other items you have done. Complete each
page before moving on to the next page. Try to do each item separately
independent of how you may have done other items.
The image aroused by an items of this test may be:
Perfectly clear and as vivid as the actual experience
Very clear and comparable in vividness to the actual
experience
Moderately clear and vivid
Not clear or vivid, but recognizable
Vague and dim
So vague and dim as to be hardly discernible
No image present at all, you only "knowing" that you
are thinking of the object

Rating 1
Rating
Rating
Rating
Rating
Rating

2
3

4
5
6

Rating 7

An example of an item on the test would be one which asked you to
consider an image which comes to your mi.nd's eye of a red apple. If
your visual image was moderately clear and vivid you would check the
rating scale and make 11 311 in the brackets as follows:
5.

Item
A red apple

Rating
( 3)

Now turn to the next page when you have understood these instructions and begin the test.
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Think of some relative or friend whom you frequently see, considering carefully the picture that rises before your mind's eye.
Classify the images suggested by each of the following questions as indicated by the degrees of clearness and vividness specified on the
Rating Scale.
Rating
Item
( )
1. The exact contour of face, head, shoulders, and body
( )
2. Characteristic poses of head, attitudes .of body, etc.
( )
3. The precise carriage, length of step, etc. in walking
( )
4. The different colors worn in.some familiar costume
Think of seeing the following, considering carefully the picture
which comes before your mind's eye; and classify the image suggested by
the following question as indicated by the degree of clearness and
vividness specified on the Rating Scale.
Item
5. The sun as it is sinking below the horizon

Rating

( )

Think of each of the following sounds, considering carefully the
image which comes to your mind's ear, and classify the images suggested
by each of the following questions as indicated by the degrees of clearness and vividness specified on the Rating Scale.
Item
Rating
6. The whistle of a locomotive
( )
7. The honk of an automobile
( )
8. The mewing of a cat
( )
9. The sound of escaping steam
( )
10. The clapping of hands in applause
( )
Think of "feeling" or touching each of the following, considering
carefully the image which comes to your mind's touch, and classify the
images suggested by each of the following questions as indicated by the
degrees of clearness and vividness specified on the Rating Scale.
Item
Rating
11. Sand
( )
12. Linen
( )
13. Fur
( )
14. The prick of a pin
( )
15. The warmth of a tepid bath
( )

61
Think of performing each of the following acts, considering carefully the image which comes to your mind's arms, legs, lips, etc., and
classify the images suggested as indicated by the degree of clearness
and vividness specified on the Rating Scale.
Item
Rating
( )
16. Running upstairs
( )
17. Springing across a gutter
18. Drawing a circle on paper
( )
( )
19. Reaching up to a high shelf
20. Kicking something out of your way
( )

I
•

I

I
I

I
J
l

Think of tasting each of the following, considering carefully the
image which comes to your mind's mouth, and classify the images suggested by each of the following questions as indicated by the degrees
of clearness and vividness on the Rating Scale.
Item
Rating
( )
21. Salt
( )
22. Granulated (white) sugar
23. Oranges
( )
( )
24. Jelly
25. Your favorite soup
( )
Think of smelling each of the following, considering carefully the
image which comes to your mind's nose, and classify the images suggested
by each of the following questions as indicated. by the degrees of clearness and vividness specified on the Rating Scale.
Item
Rating
26. An ill-ventilated room
( )
27. Cooking cabbage
( )
28. Roast beef
( )
29. Fresh paint
( )
30. New leather
( )
Think of each of the following sensations, considering carefully
the image which comes before your mind, and classify the images suggested as indicated by the degrees of clearness and vividness specified
on the Rating Scale.

\
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Item
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Rating
Fatigue
Hunger
A sore throat
Drowsiness
Repletion as from a very full meal
(This questionnaire appears in Richardson, 1969. )

(

)

(

)

(

)

(

)

{

)

APPENDIX H
GORDON TEST
The questions on this form are concerned with the ease with which
you can control and manipulate mental images. For some people t.his task
is relatively easy and for others relatively hard. One subject who
could not manipulate his imagery easily gave this illustration. He
visualized a table, one of whose legs suddenly began to collapse. He
then tried to visualize another table with four solid legs, but found it
impossible. The image of the first table with its collapsing leg persisted. Another subject reported that when he visualized a table, the
image was rather vague and dim. He could visualize it briefly but it
was difficult to retain by any voluntary effort. In both these illustrations the subjects had difficulty in controlling or manipulating
their visual imagery. It is perhaps important to emphasize that these
experiences are in no way abnormal and are as often reported as the
controllable type of image.
Read each question, then close your eyes while you try to visualize the scene described. Record your answer by underlining Yes, No,
or "Unsure," whichever is the most appropriate. Remember that your
accurate and honest answer to these questions is most important for the
validity of this study. If you have any doubts at all regarding the
answer .to. a question, underline Unsure.
Please be certain that you
answer each of the fourteen questions.
11

11

11

11

11

Can you see a batter standing at home plate waiting
for the first pitch?

Yes

No

Unsure

Can you see the same man in the same place but now
dressed in red bathing trunks?

Yes

No

Unsure

Can you hear an orchestra playing "God Bless
America"?

Yes

No

Unsure

Can you now hear it played by a single trumpet?

Yes

No

Unsure

Can you feel the texture of an ordinary nailbrush
rubbed across the tips of your fingers?

Yes

No

Unsure

Can you feel what it is like if the brush suddenly
changes to a wire one?

Yes

No

Unsure

11
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Can you feel the movement of your muscles as you
attempt to throw a baseball as far as you can?

Yes

No

Unsure

Now, can you feel the same muscles as you throw
the ball, very gently, to a small child?

Yes

No

Unsure

Can you taste the strong, sour taste of a lemon?

Yes

No

Unsure

Can you now add the flavor of white granulated
sugar to that of the lemon?

Yes

No

Unsure

You come into a freshly painted room. Can you
smell the paint . . . it's strong and overpowering?

Yes

No

Unsure

Can you now smell the same room filled with the
scent of lavender?

Yes

No

Unsure

Can you feel yourself very sleepy, beginning to
yawn, and unable to keep your eyes open?

Yes

No

Unsure

Can you now feel yourself tingling with vitality,
alert and ready for anything?

Yes

No

Unsure

(This test is adapted from Richardson, 1972.)

APPENDIX I
IPI SUBSCALES
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale
Scale

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Daydreaming Frequency
Night-dreaming Frequency
Absorption in Daydreaming
Acceptance of Daydreaming
Positive Reactions to Daydreams
Frightened Reactions to Daydreams
Visual Imagery in Daydreams
Auditory Imagery in Daydreams
Problem-solving in Daydreams
Present Orientation in Daydreams
Future Orientation in Daydreams
Past Orientation in Daydreams
Bizarre Improbable Daydreams
Mind Wandering
Achievement-oriented Daydreams
Hallucinatory Vividness of Daydreams
Fear of Failure in Daydreams
Hostile Aggressive Daydreams
Sexual Daydreams
Heroic Daydreams
Gui1 t Daydreams
Interpersonal Curiosity
Impersonal-mechanical Curiosity
Boredom Susceptibility
Mentation Rate
Distractibility
Need for External Stimulation
Self-revelation

Taken from G. J. Huba, B. Segal, & J. L. Singer, Consistency of
daydreaming styles across samples of college male and female drug and
alcohol users, Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1977, 86, No. 1, 99-102.

